Plaintiff's First Amendment to

COMES NOW , Marquitta L. Portman, Plaintiff in the above styled matter, and files this her Plaintiff's First Amendment to COMPLAINT AND SUIT, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1945, created by the General Assembly, and pursuant to O.C.G.A. Sec. 9-4-3 (CGA Sec. 110-1102), and shows this Court the following:

1.

My claim is that the underlying Final Judgment in Civil Action File No. 94-1-5243-22 is VOID as a matter of law, having no legal force or effect. It is not just voidable or subject to a collateral attack, but it is VOID ab initio.

2. 

However, the actions of many officers of the Cobb County Superior Court, herein named as defendants, would reasonably lead the average person to believe that the Final Judgment in Civil Action File No. 94-1-5243-22 is a valid Order. For a considerable period of time, M. Portman was no different than the average person, for she was told and she was led to believe that she had no choice but to sell property according to the Order, abide by custody as stated in the Order, move her home according to the Order, pay bills according to the Order, pay taxes according to the Order, and sign a Quit Claim according to the Order. M. Portman's actions were simply at the direction of the Court, regardless of her own wishes, desires, or beliefs.

3. 

However, the actions of many officers of the Cobb County Superior Court, and actions of officers of other State Courts, also lead a reasonable person to believe that the Final Judgment in Civil Action File No. 94-1-5243-22 was a VOID Order. 

• Believing that the Final Judgment was her only protection by which she could participate in her son's juvenile court case, and by direction of attorney Larry Custer, M. Portman hand delivered a copy of the Final Judgment to Cobb County Juvenile Court. The Juvenile Court acted to remove M. Portman from participation, thereby ignoring the Superior Court's Final Judgment of joint legal and physical custody. Exhibit A 
• By consent to the Honorable James G. Bodiford, the Honorable S. Lark Ingram agreed to file the requested Order in Civil Action File No. 96-1-2243-22 within the required 90 days after hearing, thereby avoiding Mandamus (Civil Action File No. 98-1-6130-__). However, once free from the threat of Mandamus she filed the Order after the 90 day required period, then immediately recused herself. By recusing herself, she was able to "hide" the status of her September 25, 1998 Order. Upon appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, Plaintiff requested that the high court reveal the status of the Order, for it was VOID also. The high court, by Rule 59, summarily denied this Plaintiff true right of appeal. The very meaning of appeal is not the application, but the process of question and answer. Plaintiff did not receive a legitimate answer from the high court.

4.

Conflict and disagreement over the validity of said Final Judgment is a genuine issue of material fact. 

5.

The Honorable Robert E. Flournoy, Jr., knew that he was duty bound to reveal his knowledge of this Plaintiff's former employment with his (Judge Flournoy's) son, Robert E. Flournoy, III prior to commencement of trial. The judge had a ministerial duty to offer his recusal to both parties, and by non-performance of his duties, and with full knowledge of the consequences, he removed himself from true and valid jurisdiction of the Civil Action. Any subsequent action by Judge Flournoy  was VOID as a matter of Law, with no legal force or effect, yet he alone was privy to that knowledge. Any subsequent action by Judge Flournoy was therefore an intentional act to mislead. For the simple reason that his knowledge, coupled with his absence of recusal offer, removed him from jurisdiction in the case, he was therefore acting as an individual, rather than as a judicial officer. Such action as an individual does not allow him to claim judicial immunity. 

6.

It is a known fact that Plaintiff, M. Portman, was employed as a legal secretary by Robert E. Flournoy, III, for a period of just over 6 months in 1987. 

7.

It is a known fact that during the period of M. Portman's employment by Robert E. Flournoy, III, Gregory R. Portman did receive legal guidance and counsel from Robert E. Flournoy, III.

8.

It is a known fact that M. Portman was dismissed by Robert E. Flournoy, III and told to "pack up your things and be out of here by 2:00." 

9.

It is a known fact that Robert E. Flournoy, III has a history of higher than average employment turnover. 

10.

It is a known fact that Robert E. Flournoy, III openly told his employees that he could "manage" any case he wanted in the Cobb County Superior Court, and that he "wasn't bragging, because it was true."

11.

It was a known fact that Robert E. Flournoy, III openly told his employees that he "knew" the system by which the judges were assigned to cases in the Cobb County Superior Court, and that he "wasn't just bragging, because it was true."

12.

It is a known fact that the U.S. Department of Labor denied unemployment benefits to M. Portman because Robert E. Flournoy, III submitted a statement that M. Portman did not have the skills to be a legal secretary. 

13.

It is a known fact that M. Portman appealed the decision within the Department of Labor and was told that Robert E. Flournoy, III was challenging the appeal because the payment of benefits would be charged directly back to Robert E. Flournoy, III due to his "overly active claims file."

14.

It is a known fact that M. Portman was denied the Department's internal appeal, yet was advised by the appeals officer to pursue her right through a final appeal to the Cobb County Superior Court. 

15.

Due to the circumstances surrounding the end of said employment, it is reasonable to believe that Robert E. Flournoy, III held resentment against M. Portman for daring to challenge him to the U.S. Department of Labor. 

16.

Due to the nature of, and the relationship between Robert E. Flournoy, Jr. and Robert E. Flournoy, III, it is reasonable to believe that the "son" had the opportunity and the availability to influence the "father," to the detriment of this Plaintiff. 

17.

It is a known fact that prior to his appointment to the Bench 13 years ago, Robert E. Flournoy, Jr. practiced law and maintained his office at 236 Washington Avenue, Marietta, GA. It is a known fact that Robert E. Flournoy, Jr. owned said building and adjoining building, 237 Roswell Street.

18.

It is a known fact that Judge Robert E. Flournoy, Jr. provided, either by lease or by gratis, legal office space for his two (attorney) sons within that same building, and adjoining building. 

19. 

It is a known fact that Robert E. Flournoy, III and Matthew Flournoy continued to practice law from that same building after Judge Robert E. Flournoy, Jr. was appointed to the Bench,  and that Judge Flournoy, Jr. continued to house his own legal records at 237 Roswell Street. Matthew Flournoy chose to move his legal practice to another location about a year later.

20.

It is a known fact that Robert E. Flournoy, III acted as agent for the lease of 237 Roswell Street after the appointment of his father to the Bench.

21.

It is a known fact that Robert E. Flournoy, III has continued to maintain his legal practice at his father's former office, 236 Washington Ave. until his own recent appointment to the Bench by Governor Roy Barnes.

22.

It is a known fact that Governor Roy Barnes and the Flournoys have long been very close friends. 

23.

It is a known fact that defendant Larry W. Yarbrough rents office space at 237 Roswell Street. 

24.

Plaintiff seeks the Court's permission to reserve her right to further amend her Complaint at a later date, to include a claim of Fraud. Because Plaintiff currently has no declaration that the Final Judgment is VOID, a claim of Fraud at this time would be premature. However, Plaintiff does show the Court that dismissal of any party prior to determination of validity of the Order would also be premature.

25.

Further Plaintiff shows this Court that determination of validity of the Final Judgment is a jury question and can be determined only after adequate discovery. Discovery was halted by defendants' Motions for Dismissal and Motions for Protective Orders because there was no judge with proper jurisdiction to hear the Motions.

26.

Plaintiff shows this Court that she has done due diligence to pursue the truth. Cobb County Superior Court has had knowledge to which this Plaintiff did not have equal access. Further, Cobb County Superior Court barred Plaintiff from acquisition of that truth on more than one occasion. Res ispa loquitor.

27.

It is a known fact that if the Final Judgment is declared VOID, then all parties have either participated in Fraud, or they have been defrauded. Dismissal of any party must therefore, be based on whether that individual participated in Fraud, or whether that individual was defrauded. Dismissal of any party at this time is premature.

28.

The conflict over whether the Final Judgment is valid or VOID is a genuine issue of material fact which should be determined by the evidence. Because it is a jury question, the defendant parties should not be dismissed by pre-trial motion.

Wherefore, Plaintiff Prays that this Court:

1. issue an Order to extend discovery as submitted in Plaintiff's motion,
2. stay dismissal of any defendant parties pending determination of the status of the Final Judgment in Civil Action File No. 94-1-5243-22,
3. grant Plaintiff such other relief as is appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

Marquitta L. Portman, Plaintiff

261 Pioneer Trail
Marietta, GA 30068-3470
770-971-9455 home

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 5th day of February 2001.

Notary Public
Commission expires:

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