Plaintiff files this Petition for Mandamus and shows the following:
1.
Defendant is a Superior Court Judge in the County of Cobb, State of Georgia, with duty to render judgment according to the Laws of Georgia and to the Code of Judicial Conduct. Defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.
2.
Plaintiff is a resident of Cobb County, Georgia and is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.
3.
By this Petition Plaintiff is seeking to enforce the performance by Defendant of a public and judicial duty as to matters in which Plaintiff has a special interest.
4.
Plaintiff did file a MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT February 19, 1998. Exhibit A.
5.
Counsel for Defendant did file DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT March 2, 1998. Exhibit B.
6.
Plaintiff did, April 21, 1998, request that the Court rule on the MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT at the Court’s earliest convenience. Exhibit C. Plaintiff did respectfully request direction from the court concerning the Court’s determination to have a hearing for oral argument.
7.
At the Court’s direction, Plaintiff did (May 1, 1998) schedule a hearing for June 24, 1998. Exhibit D.
8.
Plaintiff did request direction from the Court and did identify Plaintiff’s intentions in letters to the Court Clerk, dated May 19, 1998 and June 18, 1998. Exhibits E & F.
9.
Plaintiff did file BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT June 25, 1998. Said Brief was also incorporated into the transcript of the June 24, 1998 hearing. Exhibit G & H.
9.
Plaintiff did file her Affidavit and Verification, July 14, 1998, concerning error in the transcript of the June 24, 1998 hearing. Exhibit I.
10.
Although it was Plaintiff’s understanding that the Court expected Plaintiff to submit an Order to the Court concerning Declaratory Judgment 1 and Declaratory Judgment 2, and that the Court was choosing to delay an Order on Declaratory Judgment 3 and Declaratory Judgment 4, Plaintiff is unable to prepare and submit any Order with respect to Declaratory Judgment, for by so doing, she would be waiving her rights pursuant to O.C.G.A. 9-11-52. By expecting the preparation of the Order to be by Plaintiff, the Court was violating Plaintiff’s rights to due process. (See Exhibit I, Plaintiff’s Affidavit concerning errors in the transcript.)
11.
The Honorable S. Lark Ingram did request guidance from Defendant’s Counsel, (Exhibit H, page 25, line 4) during the June 24, 1998 hearing and Counsel for the Defendant did advise the Court that Plaintiff should, “in an abundance of caution, ...... re-subpoena everybody.” Counsel for Defendant did further advise the Court that Plaintiff should “follow the law exactly as to these subpoenas” (Exhibit H, page 25, lines 20-21) and that Plaintiff “may anticipate some motions to quash at hearings on those motions prior to the actual hearing on the motion for new trial.” (Exhibit H, page 25, lines 22-24)
12.
Plaintiff hereby requests the Court to investigate the content of the conversation which occurred between Counsel for Defendant and the Court’s own Clerk while the Honorable S. Lark Ingram was absent from the courtroom, Exhibit H, Page 10, lines 4-7. Such conversation was clearly intended to instill fear in the Plaintiff and to intimidate the Plaintiff from proceeding further with any action against powerful Officers of the Court.
13.
The opportunity for the attempted threat and intimidation, alleged in Paragraph 12 above, is evidenced by the following: The hearing was conducted during the normal lunch time, as evidenced by the Court’s comment, Exhibit H, Page 23, lines 17-19. Besides the court officers, only the Plaintiff and one other witness was present. After the hearing, said witness commented to Plaintiff her own fear concerning the content of the conversation. The hearing was begun at or about 12:30 p.m. and was delayed from 9:00 a.m. because Counsel for Defendant had submitted a letter (although misdirected), Exhibit J, indicating a conflict with one case in State Court of Cherokee County and two cases in State Court of Cobb County. Counsel for Defendant did not arrive in the courtroom until after 11:30 a.m. and after the only other remaining case had begun. Counsel for Defendant had appeared only in State Court of Cherokee County at 9:00 a.m., for the two cases in State Court of Cobb County were actually scheduled for 1:30 p.m. that same day, rather than 9:00 a.m., as his conflict letter stated. Exhibit K. The action taken in State Court of Cherokee County at 9:00 left counsel free to be en route to Cobb County by 9:30 am. Court Reporter Rhonda Whitmire had been directed to turn the recorder off during the absence of the judge, during which same time the conversation between the Court Clerk and Counsel for Defendant did ensue.
14.
Plaintiff submits that her Motion to Disqualify the Honorable Robert E. Flournoy, Jr., with accompanying Affidavit and Verification, Exhibits L & M, was erroneously adjudicated by the Honorable Dorothy Robinson, Exhibit N, and that Plaintiff was denied her Motion for Certification of Ruling Under O.C.G.A. 5-6-34(b), Exhibit O & P, for reasons other than strict legal and procedural causes.
15.
Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, 3, D (1), Judge Robinson had a responsibility to submit the actions of the Honorable Robert E. Flournoy, Jr. to the Judicial Qualifications Commission, for the prima facie evidence submitted as exhibits with the pleadings clearly showed that the Honorable Robert E. Flournoy, Jr. denied Plaintiff’s request for Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. Through witness testimony expected at the hearing (such hearing having been properly requested by Plaintiff in Request for Notice of Oral Argument, filed December 23, 1997), plaintiff would have shown that Judge Flournoy had established a precedence for judicial actions NOT ON THE RECORD, and in some cases intentionally handled OFF THE RECORD. This a direct violation of the basic intent of our judicial system, and in particular our Courts of Record. Such actions by a Superior Court Judge are impeachable offenses.
16.
Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, 3, D (2), Judge Flournoy was bound to report the actions of both Daryl Kidd and Lawrence B. Custer to the State Bar of Georgia for violations of Standards of Conduct.
17.
The Final Decree of Divorce, signed by Judge Flournoy December 8, 1995, and filed December 11, 1995 was not properly adjudicated. Applicant did not sign the Final Decree, nor did her attorney sign the Final Decree. The Final Decree was NOT by agreement between the parties, but was issued as a Bench Order of Final Decree more than 90 days after the trial. Exhibit B OF current Exhibit M.
18.
The Honorable Dorothy A. Robinson erred in the citation of cause for granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify. Order dated January 9, 1998, Exhibit N, “Courts may not add other grounds of disqualification — In order to disqualify a judge there must exist a ground authorized by law to disqualify him; it is not for the courts to add other grounds of disqualification. Blakeman v. Harwell, 1948 Ga. 165, 31 S.E.2d 50 (1944); Mapp v. State 204 Ga. App. 647, 420 S.E.2d 615 (1992).” O.C.G.A. 15-1-8 Annotations, p. 42.
19.
Plaintiff was denied a Motion for Reconsideration and denied a Hearing for Oral Argument, as requested and verbally granted by the Honorable Dorothy A. Robinson (Exhibit Q). Such denial is in violation of Plaintiff’s right to due process, flowing from the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff was prepared to show evidence of violations of Standards of Conduct by several attorneys involved in the case at the scheduled hearing.
20.
The judicial misconduct by the Honorable Robert E. Flournoy, Jr. is not exclusive to the custody issue, Civil Action File No. 96-1-2243-34, but is an extension of judicial misconduct which was evidenced in Civil Action File No. 94-1-5243-22. Due to actions of Fraud (meeting the five part test of fraud) by several attorneys, Plaintiff was barred from pursuing her rights to a remedy from the fraudulent Final Decree of Divorce.
21.
In an effort to cover up the erroneous actions by Judge Flournoy, Judge Robinson has compounded the conspiracy and cover-up and has attempted to redirect this Court’s attention toward the Defendant in Civil Action File No. 96-1-2243-22 However, the actions of the Honorable Robert E. Flournoy are now one basis of Plaintiff’s Extraordinary Motion for a New Trial and are therefore completely subject to proper adjudication by this Superior Court.
22.
Plaintiff hereby requests that the Honorable S. Lark Ingram act in a responsible manner to ensure that Plaintiff’s MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT is properly adjudicated, including Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pursuant to O.C.G.A. 9-11-52.
23.
Plaintiff hereby requests that the Honorable S. Lark Ingram abide by Superior Court Rule 6.3 and O.C.G.A. 15-6-21(b) & (c) and assure that Judgment is rendered within the time period prescribed by law.
24.
Plaintiff hereby requests that the Honorable S. Lark Ingram adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically, but not limited to, Canon 2, A, Canon 2, B, Canon 3, B (2), Canon 3, B (8), Canon 3, C, (1) & (2), and Canon 3, D, (1) & (2). Plaintiff hereby requests that the Honorable S. Lark Ingram adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, E, (1) (a). Exhibit S.
25.
Plaintiff hereby requests that the Honorable S. Lark Ingram adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5, C, (1) and Canon 5, C, (3). Exhibit T.
26.
Plaintiff submits that the actions of the Honorable Dorothy A. Robinson as noted above are subsequent violations of the Judicial Code of Conduct to the actions of the Honorable Robert E. Flournoy, Jr. This Court, the Honorable S. Lark Ingram, has had this case since it’s assignment to her Court, January 9, 1998. Plaintiff submits that this case is now a series of cover-ups by the Officers of this Superior Court, and that the Honorable S. Lark Ingram is attempting to cause Plaintiff to submit to even further abuse of Plaintiff’s legal rights. Exhibit T. Plaintiff does not agree to waive any of her constitutional or due process rights.
27.
Plaintiff submits that action for Declaratory Judgment cannot be determined by any concession or agreement by the opposing party for that is contrary to the intent and nature of Declaratory Judgment. The Court’s duty is to issue a Court Order, which after considering argument within the bounds of discretion, is the opinion of the Court. The Court’s duty is to abide by the law, not by concession between the parties. If Plaintiff has stated any of the four requests for Declaratory Judgment in language or context which is contrary to Georgia Law, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court restate the Declaration to reflect the Court’s own opinion so as to be in adherence with Georgia Law and to settle and afford Plaintiff relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court issue a Mandamus Nisi requiring Defendant to act according to the Judicial Code of Conduct in the disposition of Plaintiff’s Declaratory Judgment, and that Defendant be required to move in accordance with Georgia Law. Plaintiff further prays that the legal questions of fact raised in Plaintiff’s Petition for Mandamus be answered by the Defendant and that if a legal question of fact is raised by the Defendant’s pleading, that issues be submitted for a trial by jury at a time and place to be designated by the Court, and that on the hearing the Mandamus may be made Absolute. Plaintiff does not waive any of her constitutional or due process rights and prays that this Court protect Plaintiff’s rights from further abuse of discretion.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of July, 1998.
Personally appeared before the undersigned, duly authorized to administer oaths, came Marquitta L. Portman, who after being duly sworn, did say and depose that the facts contained in the within and foregoing PETITION FOR MANDAMUS are true and correct.
__________________________________
Marquitta L. Portman
Sworn to and subscribed before me this
30th day of July, 1998.
___________________________________
Notary Public
Index of Exhibits
A MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT February 19, 1998.
B. DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT March 2, 1998
C. Plaintiff’s letter, April 21, 1998, requesting that the Court rule on the MOTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT at the Court’s earliest convenience.
D. Plaintiff’s request (May 1, 1998) to schedule a hearing for June 24, 1998.
E. Plaintiff’s letter to the Court Clerk, dated May 19, 1998.
F. Plaintiff’s letter to the Court Clerk, dated June 18, 1998.
G. BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT June 25, 1998.
H. Transcript of June 24, 1998 Hearing.
I. Plaintiff’s Affidavit and Verification, July 14, 1998.
J. Conflict letter from Larry W. Yarbrough, June 22, 1998.
K. State Court of Cobb County record of case against Michael Laye; 97T34882. State Court of Cobb County record of case against Michael R. A. Thompson; 948M1640.
L. MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. FLOURNOY JR., with accompanying Defendant’s RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY, PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. FLOURNOY, JR., AND AFFIDAVIT OF MARQUITTA L. PORTMAN, filed September 22, 1997.
M. Affidavit and Verification, filed August 27, 1997.
N. Order by the Honorable Dorothy Robinson, January 9, 1998.
O. Plaintiff’s Motion for Certification of Ruling Under O.C.G.A. 5-6-34(b), filed February 9, 1998.
P. Order by the Honorable Dorothy Robinson, denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Certification of Ruling Under O.C.G.A. 5-6-34(b), filed February 12, 1998.
Q. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, filed January 14, 1998, including Letter to the Honorable Dorothy A. Robinson, December 17, 1997, and Order by Judge Robinson, filed the same day as Motion, January 14, 1998.
R. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 2 & 3.
S. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5.
T. Letter to the Honorable S. Lark Ingram, dated July 20, 1998, with attached transcript of phone message from Paige Moffett, law clerk.