MARQUITTA L. PORTMAN, *
Appellant, *
-VS- * CASE NO S99A0440
S. LARK INGRAM, *
Appellee. *
Notice is hereby given that Marquitta L. Portman, Plaintiff above-named, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia from the FINAL ORDER entered in this action on September 18, 1998.
Plaintiff was represented pro se and Defendant was represented by Kathryn L. Allen of the Department of Law, State of Georgia.
Petition for Mandamus was filed July 30, 1998. Plaintiff did file her Jury Trial Demand as a part of her prayers in the Petition for Mandamus, and also as a separate pleading August 31, 1998. The Court has issued four separate Orders: August 19, 1998 (Defendant’s recusal as trier); September 2, 1998 (Court’s determination of hearing date); September 18, 1998 (Final Order denying both a jury trial and the petition for mandamus); and, September 28, 1998 (Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Findings of Fact and Plaintiff’s Motion for Certification, further clarifying that the final order is ripe for appeal without certification by Superior Court).
The clerk will please transmit the entire record, including the certified transcript and Plaintiff’s evidence presented at the hearing of September 16, 1998.
Applicant shows that jurisdiction is properly in this Supreme Court of Georgia, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 (a) (1), O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 (a) (6), O.C.G.A. § 9-6-1, O.C.G.A. § 9-6-28, O.C.G.A. § 15-6-9, O.C.G.A. § 15-6-9, O.C.G.A. § 15-2-8, O.C.G.A. § 99-6-1.4, and specifically O.C.G.A. § 99-6-6.3, Paragraph III, (5); further supported by the Opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia in the case of Graham v. Cavender et al., No. 40769, 252 Ga. 123; 311 S.E.2d 832; 1984 Ga. LEXIS 621 (February 10, 1984, Decided); and further, based on the provisions of the Constitution of 1983, (Article VI, § I, Par. IV (Code Ann § 2-2704).
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of October, 1998.
Marquitta L. Portman,
Plaintiff / Applicant
Plaintiff Portman: I HAVE BEEN MADE TO FEEL OBSTINATE AND LITIGIOUS FOR SIMPLY RESPECTING THE JUDGMENTS OF SUPERIOR COURT. OUT OF SELF-PRESERVATION, I HAVE SPENT AN INORDINATE NUMBER OF HOURS RESEARCHING AND STUDYING THE LAW, SO THAT I COULD WORK WITHIN THE STRUCTURE OF THE LAW. SOMETIMES I FEEL LIKE AN ELDERLY LAW STUDENT, TAKING ONE LONG GRUELING BAR EXAM. I PRESENTLY DO NOT KNOW IF I AM TRULY DIVORCED OR IF THE FINAL DECREE IS, IN FACT, NOW VOID, THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT WHICH I AM SEEKING FROM DEFENDANT
HOLDS WITHIN IT THE ANSWER AS TO MY LEGAL RIGHTS, STATUS AND OTHER LEGAL RELATIONS. WITHOUT IT, I AM LEFT IN A NO-MAN’S LAND OF MAYBE DIVORCED, MAYBE NOT DIVORCED.
C: LET ME PUT IT THIS WAY; YOU’RE LEGALLY DIVORCED UNTIL A COURT SAYS OTHERWISE. BUT I DON’T NEED TO GET INTO THAT. THAT’S THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. IN FACT, DO NOT TELL ME ABOUT THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. I’VE GOT ANOTHER CASE, WE HAVE GOT OTHER LITIGANTS THAT ARE WAITING ON YOU. NOW, LET ME SAY THIS; ARE YOU SAYING AS FAR AS -- AS FAR AS THE WAY YOU WERE DESCRIBING YOURSELF -- ARE YOU SAYING THIS COURT TREATED YOU ANYTHING WITH LESS THAN COURTESY, DIGNITY AND RESPECT?
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Court: DO YOU HAVE A FINAL JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE?
Plaintiff Portman: I DO.