Appellant herein responds to Appellee’s assertion that this instant appeal, on the issue of Judgment to deny a Jury Trial and Writ of Mandamus, is frivolous. Appellant responds, and shows this Court that said Motion should be denied, considering the following five arguments:
1: APPELLEE IS STATING A POSITION CONTRADICTORY TO HER OWN PREVIOUSLY STATED POSITION; SHE IS NOW ATTEMPTING TO ARGUE AGAINST HERSELF AND AGAINST THE HONORABLE JAMES G. BODIFORD.
To cite the comments of Appellee’s counsel at the September 16, 1998 hearing:...we have set our judicial system up in a certain way to have it work and if the litigant is not satisfied with the way the judge rules, the proper remedy is appeal and that’s the way our system works the best. (T — p. 17, lines 20-23)
Further, to cite the comments of Judge Bodiford from that same hearing:
...you’ve got an absolute right as soon as we prepare the Order since this is a final judgment - - you have got an absolute right to appeal, You don’t have to ask my permission. (T — p. 14, lines 19-22)
Yet further, Judge Bodiford:
...I’ll make my ruling and whether you like it or not, either one of you, in a few minutes you will have a final ruling and you can appeal it. (T — p. 26, lines 17-19)
2. APPELLEE CLAIMS THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR AN APPEAL, “FOR APPELLANT HAS WHAT SHE WAS ASKING FOR, AN ORDER IN HER FAVOR AND SHE DIDN’T HAVE TO PREPARE IT.” (page 1, paragraph 1 of Motion)
If Appellant had received a timely, and therefore valid Order, she would be appealing that Order, for it was not in Appellant’s favor. However, because Appellee signed the Order, and then filed it after the 90 days as required by O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21, Appellant now simply seeks a legal ruling from this Supreme Court that the Order of September 25, 1998 is null and VOID. The obvious problem is that Appellant sought a valid ORDER, which by Law was her right, yet Appellee continued to refuse to do her judicial duty. First, she refused to prepare any order. Then she refused to prepare it after Appellant submitted an Affidavit explaining Appellant’s reluctance to prepare it. Even after the Petition for Mandamus was filed, Appellee continued to fail in her duty. The resounding proof of “refusal” is Appellee’s failure to complete the Order, even after agreeing to the terms set out by Judge Bodiford. When someone goes before a judge and, given a choice, says, “Yes, I will do the thing that you propose,” and then they blatantly don’t do that thing, what are the consequences? Should those consequences be less for a judge who fails to do what they tell another judge they will do?
3. APPELLANT HAS A CLEAR AND LEGAL RIGHT TO THE ANSWERS SOUGHT IN HER APPEAL FOR THEY CONSTITUTE A PROPERTY RIGHT.
A war of “legal procedure” has been waged against this Appellant, who is neither trained nor experienced in the Law. Sadly, it has taken this “war” to happen before Appellant could comprehend what has been purposely hidden and so ardently protected. Simply, a VOID Order. Appellant seeks that which is her right, declaration of the VOID Order. Her pleadings give evidence that such a declaration constitutes a property right. Knowledge of her status, legal rights, and financial obligations is paramount to her religious, moral, ethical, and emotional state of mind. Appellant claims a property right to said knowledge and declaration.
This Appellant seeks that any and all Orders which have been issued in any Cobb County Superior Court action, in which this Appellant is or was a party, which are VOID by matter of Law, be declared VOID by written and filed Judgment of this Supreme Court.
4. APPELLEE’S CLAIM IS AS VOID AS THE ORDER.
Appellee claims that Appellant “won her case before Judge S. Lark Ingram.” Appellant responds that she clearly lost the case before Judge S. Lark Ingram. In fact, nothing in the Law states that the winning party is exclusively given rights, direction, or opportunity to prepare an Order. Judge Bodiford explained that, “that was a common procedure, the winning party -- just like I’m going to do here when I look to Mrs. Allen and said ‘prepare the order’, that’s -- that is something that’s done each and every day many scores of times a day on this floor.”(T — p. 60, lines 4-8) Apparently, a judge may give direction for one party to prepare the Order, but the intention is for expediency only. The duty remains that of the Judge. Some judges are known for directing the losing party to prepare an Order. Therefore, it was error (which should have been a jury’s error) for Judge Bodiford to deduce such conclusion.
“I knew that you must have been the winning party if they looked to you and said ‘prepare the order’” (T — page 60, lines 13-15)
Appellant would have appealed the Order — if — she had an Order from which to Appeal. She had none. Judge S. Lark Ingram twice refused to file an Order. First, by directing someone else to “prepare” the order. In fact, she did not direct Appellant to prepare the order, but rather she said she [could not do any Order, one of the parties would have to do that.] paraphrased Because the Court Reporter stopped the tape and the take-down prior to Judge Ingram’s final comments, the only record of this is in Appellant’s Affidavit of July 14, 1998, paragraph 9.This same affidavit was reviewed by Judge Bodiford while preparing the sought Order from the June 24, 1998 hearing.
After the close of the court reporter’s takedown, the Honorable S. Lark Ingram did state that she could not prepare any order, but that the parties would be responsible for preparing and submitting any order. Because Plaintiff had requested that the proceedings be recorded, Plaintiff stated that she would be able to prepare an order only after receipt of a printed transcript. Court reporter Rhonda Whitmire stated that she would have the transcript ready the following week. Whereupon, Judge Ingram stated to Affiant that would be fine, there was no hurry.
Appellee has made no objection to Appellant’s reconstruction of the end of that hearing. Therefore, the Record shows that, “the Honorable S. Lark Ingram did state that she could not prepare any order, but that the parties would be responsible for preparing and submitting any order.” It was Judge Bodiford’s interpretation that Appellant had been directed to prepare the Order, and it was also his interpretation that Appellant had won. Clearly, these were issues which should have been put to a jury. At the initial statement by Judge Bodiford that Appellant “had won” (T—p. 5, line 8), Appellant was not given an opportunity to respond to that statement, but was directed to another question. Again, Judge Bodiford interpreted the case as, “so far she has ruled for you each and every time which is.....because you’re winning so far,” (T—p. 29, lines 10-14) yet again Appellant was not allowed the opportunity to respond, but was directed to another issue. Finally, when Appellant was allowed to present her prepared comments, she prefaced with the statement:
....I would like to point out that you made the comment that I have won every ruling she has made and I would like to ask you to review -- I have had no Orders from her except her recusal. (T — p. 31, lines 10-14)
Therein, a brief conversation ensued concerning the “appealability” of an Order which has not yet been filed. Appellant then stated:
I think winning or losing is a matter of opinion and my opinion is not that I won on the issue of declaratory judgment. I did not perceive it that way. I may have misunderstood but of course when it’s put down in writing, you have a better opportunity to evaluate it. (T — p. 32, lines 4-9)
The second statement of Appellee’s motion is erroneous, and therein lies the error of Appellee’s argument. The claim that Appellant now has an Order on the Declaratory Judgment is false. Appellant seeks to have that Order declared null and void, as is her right, for it was filed after the 90 days specified in O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21. Appellant has a clear legal right to have the Order declared VOID, for it was not timely.
Appellant did not win her case before Judge S. Lark Ingram. Declaratory Judgment is not a case to be “won.” It is designed to declare the rights of the parties so as to protect the petitioner from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to a party’s rights, status, and legal relations, and it appearing that the ends of justice require that such should be made for the guidance and protection of the petitioner. The Law is simple. Appellant had a right. Appellee, as a representative of the judiciary in Cobb County Superior Court did refuse to acknowledge that right.
5. APPELLEE’S INNUENDO THAT APPELLANT ENJOYS SPEAKING IN THE COURTROOM OR RELISHES THE OPPORTUNITY TO FILE MORE PAPERS IS A BLATANT ATTEMPT TO MISREPRESENT APPELLANT TO THIS COURT.
Pursuit of justice is sometimes accomplished with little effort. Pursuit of justice in the face of intentional deceit requires the patience of Job. Appellant has not multiplied the litigation, but rather, has had to do due diligence in the face of intent to deceive. Appellee correctly points out that Appellant “was unable to tell Judge Bodiford what she wanted from the litigation without taking ‘all afternoon.’” Appellant did not wish to insult Judge Bodiford, but the answer was almost too simple to explain if it wasn’t already apparent.
Surely it is evident that Appellant seeks the truth about the adjudication or non-adjudication of her divorce. She is not out to make a mockery of the system, as Appellee’s Motion suggests. The system stands on it’s own merits, and when rooted in the basic tenants of truth and justice, the system will remain strong.
Appellant seeks the truth from this Supreme Court solely because Superior Court of Cobb County refuses to yield the truth. Further, Appellant seeks declaration that the instant Motion is abusive and intended to intimidate Appellant from pursuing rights which are hers by both Federal and State Law.
If this Supreme Court finds that Appellant does not have the right to know the truth about the adjudication or non-adjudication of her divorce, then Appellant offers this court the amount of the penalty as an apology to the other citizens of the State of Georgia.
Respectfully submitted,
Marquitta L. Portman
Appellant
261 Pioneer Trail
Marietta, GA 30068-3470
770-971-9455 home
770-528-6627 ext 233 school and office
(certificate of service attached, March 4, 1999)